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Ralph Peters is a regular columnist with the New
York Post.
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 The
Cost Of Stopping Iran
Are there any good solutions?...
[Ralph
Peters] 2/23/06
Washington
joined the rest of the world in criticizing yesterday's detonation
of a nuclear weapon by Iran, but America's reaction appeared
half-hearted to European allies who suspect the U.S. of tacit
support for the shah's pet program.
" 'It's
pure hypocrisy,' a European Union spokesperson declared. 'How
can Washington denounce Tehran's bomb in one breath, then add
that it understands the shah's concerns about remaining defenseless
in a nuclear neighborhood? Could Iran have developed this weapon
without U.S. complicity? The Americans have been the dominant
presence in Iran for over 50 years, since the era of this shah's
father.' "
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Ralph
Peters is a retired Army officer and the author of 19 books,
as well as of hundreds of essays and articles, written both
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Of course,
there is no shah on a Peacock Throne now, and the United States
stands outside of Iran's borders looking in (a bit too closely
for Tehran's comfort these days). But it can be helpful, if
uncomfortable, to consider how different our reaction to an
Iranian nuclear capability might be had the 1979 revolution
failed. Would we be one-tenth as determined to prevent "our
man in Tehran" from pursuing nuclear weapons?
This matters,
since an issue that seems obvious to us — the mullahs
must not get their hands on nukes — can look very different
from a foreign perspective. Almost unbearably proud, the Persians
at the core of Iranian society find it insulting to be treated
as less worthy than Indians or even Pakistanis (regarded by
Persians as barely civilized).
Meanwhile,
our government negotiates with New Delhi over the transfer
of advanced nuclear technology to India — which is emerging
as a crucial ally. We remain uncomfortable with Islamabad's
nuclear arsenal, yet we've managed to overlook it in the greater
interest (to us) of pursuing the Long War, a k a the Global
War on Terror. Given its blind commitment to Riyadh, the Clinton
administration even suppressed field reports of Saudi backing
for Pakistan's nuclear program in the mid-'90s.
If you sat
in the halls of power in Tehran, how seriously would you take
Washington's commitment to nonproliferation? As for Europe,
when faced with the Last Judgment, the continent's leaders
will call for further negotiations with Lucifer and threaten
God with sanctions.
And we now
know that those sanctions do not work. Period. They may mildly
inconvenience foreign leaders and their cronies who are denied
shopping and whore-chasing trips to Paris or London, but all
sanction regimes have been so porous that the well-connected
continue to live well while the common people suffer — with
their pains artfully aggravated by their governments to intensify
popular ire against the West.
As for a
military option against Iran's nuclear facilities, it remains
a possibility — perhaps ultimately a necessity — but
those pundits calling blithely for air-strikes have no conception
of how intense and difficult a campaign would be required.
The Iranians learned from the fate of Saddam Hussein's nuclear
project: Tehran's program is hidden, hardened and human-shielded.
The Iranians
dispersed their facilities, concealed whatever they could,
went underground where possible — and have made sure
that their key sites are populated not only by Iranians but
also by foreign advisers (not least Russians). A serious bombing
campaign could take weeks, requiring detailed post-strike damage
assessments and follow-on missions. Casualties would include
third-party nationals — and Tehran would not be above
creating additional casualties to excite domestic rage and
global sympathy.
If Washington
and its allies decide that the military option is unavoidable,
will the campaign fail in the face of opposition from the media?
Would it be interrupted as tragically as the First Battle of
Fallujah, resulting in the strengthening of our enemies? Could
we stick it through to the end if thousands of Iranians were
killed, while the Kremlin rattled its rusty saber and China
aligned against us?
The point
of these arguments is not to advance the Iranian cause. Tehran
must not be allowed to develop nuclear weapons. But we need
less bilious rhetoric and more incisive, honest thought. We
may agree that it's essential to block Iran's religious fascists
from acquiring nukes, but doing something about it is just
plain hard. And we cannot afford a replay of previous adventures
in which the vessels carrying our good intentions broke up
on the shoals of a reality more complex than we had acknowledged.
Even if the
international community agrees on sanctions, they won't work.
Sanctions would only unite Iran's key population groups while
giving the mullahs the gift of several years — perhaps
a decade or more — to pursue their nuclear ambitions.
A military option looks increasingly like the best of the bad
choices facing us.
Yet, even
were a bombing campaign to succeed — despite the inevitable
global anger — Washington would face a different setback.
The paradox of Iran is that, if we can avoid a violent clash,
no other country between Israel and India is as likely to become
a firm American ally in future decades (once the theocracy
falls, as it finally will).
A terrible
American weakness is our belief that the world is simple and
that obvious solutions are out there waiting for us to discover
them. Not only isn't the international situation black and
white — sometimes there are no good solutions at all.
We expect perfect results in an adamantly imperfect world.
And we are consistently disappointed.
In the real
world in which we live, the best outcomes are flawed. Sometimes,
you must expend blood and treasure merely for transient advantage:
to gain time, not a decisive triumph. It's another paradox
that, in this great age of America's unprecedented power, our
level of strategic thought is less sophisticated than it was
in the Lincoln White House — to say nothing of the under-appreciated
Eisenhower presidency.
We speak
before we think, act before we analyze, and pretend the world
is as we wish it to be.
Iran must
be prevented from gaining nuclear weapons. But how high a price
are you willing to pay to achieve that goal?
This time,
let's be honest about the costs. -one-
Ralph Peters'
latest book is New
Glory: Expanding America's Global Supremacy
This
piece first appeared in the New York Post
copyright 2006 - NY Post
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